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Abstract 
The coupling of perception and action has been strongly indicated by evidence that 
the observation of an action primes a response in the observer. It has been proposed that these 
primed responses may be inhibited when the observer is able to more closely distinguish 
between self- and other-generated actions – the greater the distinction, then the greater the 
inhibition of the primed response. This self-other distinction is shown to be enhanced 
following a period of visual feedback of self-generated action. The present study was 
designed to examine how sensorimotor experiences pertaining to self-generated action affect 
primed responses from observed actions. Single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation was 
used to investigate corticospinal activity elicited during the observation of index- and little-
finger actions before and after training (self-generated action). For sensorimotor training, 
participants executed finger movements with or without visual feedback of their own 
movement. Results showed that the increases in muscle-specific corticospinal activity elicited 
from action-observation persisted after training without visual feedback, but did not emerge 
following training with visual feedback. This inhibition in corticospinal activity during 
action-observation following training with vision could have resulted from the refining of 
internal models of self-generated action, which then led to a greater distinction between ‘self’ 
and ‘other’ actions. 
 
Keywords: 
Action-observation, Perception-action coupling, Inhibition, Sensorimotor experience, 
Corticospinal excitability 
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Introduction 
It is understood that there is a coupling between the neural codes representing the 
perceptual effects of an action and the neural codes that lead to the execution of an action; a 
process referred to as perception-action coupling. As a consequence of this coupling, it is 
suggested that the observation of another person’s action maps onto and activates a 
corresponding motor representation within the observer (Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, 
& Prinz, 2001; Oberman & Ramachandran, 2007; Prinz, 1997; Rizzolatti & Singaglia, 2010). 
Behavioural evidence supporting the activation of the corresponding motor representation 
comes from a series of reports that responses take longer to initiate (Brass, Bekkering, & 
Prinz, 2001; Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000) or are executed with greater 
error (Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003; cf. Constable, de Grosbois, Lung, Tremblay, 
Pratt & Welsh, in press) when the observed response of another person is incongruent with 
the action the observer is executing (e.g., observing a vertical arm movement while 
simultaneously executing a horizontal arm movement). It is suggested that these interference 
effects emerge because the observation of an incongruent action elicits a corresponding motor 
representation of the incongruent action within the observer, and then interferes with the 
coding and the generation of the intended or instructed action (Blakemore & Frith, 2005). 
Many researchers have proposed that these interference effects result from an action-
observation or mirror-matching system within the human brain (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; 
Rizzolatti & Craighero et al., 2004). Neuro-imaging data has extensively supported this claim 
by showing that there is an overlap of neural regions (including the inferior parietal lobule 
[IPL], inferior frontal gyrus [IFG] and/or ventral premotor cortex [vPM]) that are activated by 
both the observation and execution of a single action (Cross, Kraemer, Hamilton, Kelley, & 
Grafton, 2009; Gazzola, Rizzolatti, Wicker, & Keysers, 2007; Iaconboni et al., 1999). More 
direct neurophysiological evidence for the activation of motor representations during action-
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observation has been derived from studies using single-pulse transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS). Indeed, when single-pulse TMS is delivered over the primary motor 
cortex (M1) during action-observation, there is an increase in the amplitude of motor-evoked 
potentials (MEPs) at the precise musculature (e.g., first dorsal interosseous [FDI]) featured 
within the observed action (e.g., index finger abduction/precision grip) (Alaerts, Swinnen, & 
Wenderoth, 2009; Cattaneo, Caruana, Jezzini, & Rizzolatti, 2009; Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & 
Rizzolatti, 1995; Gangitano, Mottaghy, & Pascual-Leone, 2001; Sartori, Xompero, 
Bucchioni, & Castiello 2012). The increase in MEP amplitude is thought to occur because of 
increases in the excitability of the cortical neurons representing the observed action within 
the observer. That is, the observation of an action activates the same neurons as when the 
observer actually executes the action.  
Recently, there has been evidence that factors such as social context can modulate the 
magnitude of responses derived from perception-action coupling during action-observation. 
For example, the initial priming of a pro-social or anti-social attitude can subsequently 
modulate motor interference (e.g., Cook & Bird, 2011; Leighton, Bird, Orsini, & Heyes, 
2010; Roberts, Bennett, & Hayes, 2015) as well as corticospinal excitability during action-
observation (Hogeveen & Obhi, 2012; Obhi, Hogeveen, & Pascual-Leone, 2011). This 
modulation has been attributed to the regions of the brain typically associated with social 
cognition including the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and right temporo-parietal junction 
(rTPJ) (Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Santiesteban, Banissy, Catmur, & Bird, 2012; 
Sowden & Catmur, 2015). Interestingly, these neural regions are also implicated in 
distinguishing between self- and other-generated actions. Due to this functional overlap, it is 
reasonable to predict that the modulation of perception-action coupling is inversely related to 
the distinction between self and others (see Sowden & Shah, 2014, for a review). That is, by 
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decreasing (or increasing) the distinction between self and other there may be an increase (or 
decrease) in the magnitude of primed responses following action-observation. 
In addition to these high-level socio-cognitive processes, there may be low-level 
processes that also contribute toward the distinction between self and other. To elucidate, 
self-generated actions entail the generation of a forward model that enables the prediction of 
the upcoming ‘state’ of the system along with its sensory consequences (Wolpert & 
Ghahramani, 2000; see also von Holst, 1954). Whenever the anticipated and actual sensory 
consequences are closely matched, then they are assumed to be a product of the ‘self’ 
(Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000; Shergill, Bays, Frith, & Wolpert, 2003; Shergill, 
Samson, Bays, Frith, & Wolpert, 2005). Alternatively, when the anticipated and actual 
sensory consequences are mismatched, then they are attributed to ‘other’ sources. It is 
through this process that we may garner a ‘sense of agency’, as reflected by the ‘intentional 
binding’ effect (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). The intentional binding effect refers to 
how the perceived time of an external sensory event (i.e., auditory tone) and the preceding 
voluntary action (i.e., executed finger press) can become more closely bound together 
compared to the same sensory event taking place after an involuntary movement (i.e., a 
movement generated via cortical TMS). Therefore, in the context of a forward model, it 
appears the generation of a forward model elicits predicted sensory consequences, which can 
then bias or attenuate the judgement of the actual sensory events and become coupled with 
the executed action. 
Of interest to the present study, it has been shown that a period of stimulus-response 
associative learning can enhance the intentional binding effect (Moore, Dickinson, & 
Fletcher, 2011; Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009). In other words, an increase in an 
individual’s sensorimotor experience gained through training enhances intentional binding. 
This enhancement may unfold because the repeated and consistent pairing of an executed 
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action and given sensory event leads to an association in which the external sensory feedback 
is coupled or integrated with the internal model of action (Hayes, Andrew, Elliott, Roberts, & 
Bennett, 2012a; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2010; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000; see also Elsner & 
Hommel, 2001). This integration may be able to accommodate and enhance the distinction 
between self and other, which may enable the observer to inhibit primed responses and/or 
isolate the response codes that are typically evoked during action-observation. Therefore, the 
primed responses elicited by action-observation should decrease following relevant 
sensorimotor experiences. 
Although the prediction that observation-evoked responses decreasing following 
sensorimotor experiences may seem logical, recent studies have focused on the influence of 
prior sensorimotor experiences on response priming to elucidate the mechanisms that mediate 
perception-action coupling. That is, the investigations of imitation and mimicry have led to 
the conclusion that enhancing stimulus-response associations formed throughout the lifespan 
can enhance the imitation or mimicry of observed actions (e.g., Cook, Dickinson, & Heyes, 
2012; Cook, Press, Dickinson, & Heyes, 2010; Heyes, Bird, Johnson, & Haggard, 2005; 
Press, Gillmeister, & Heyes, 2007). In support of this view, it is shown that the imitation 
effects generated by the observation of congruent compared to incongruent actions can be 
attenuated or reversed after an extended period of incompatible stimulus-response training. 
That is, the shorter response times for closing the hand when observing a hand closing 
compared to observing a hand opening became attenuated and reversed after observers 
completed a training phase in which they paired their response with the incongruent stimulus 
(e.g., closing their hand while observing a hand open). In addition, the increased corticospinal 
activity that is shown during action-observation can be relocated to the precise musculature 
adopted during incompatible stimulus-response training (Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2007; see 
also complementary/reciprocal responses; Sartori, Bucchioni, & Castiello, 2013). For 
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example, Catmur et al. (2007) reported that, following a series of training trials in which the 
execution of index finger abduction coincided with the observation of a model abducting the 
little finger, the peak-to-peak amplitude of MEPs generated in the FDI (index finger 
abductor) began to increase during the observation of the incongruent little finger abduction. 
These works have heavily substantiated the Associative Sequence Learning theory, which 
suggests that the perception-action coupling underlying imitation is subject to factors of 
ontogeny (i.e., environment-based) rather than phylogeny (i.e., evolution-based) (Heyes, 
2001; Heyes & Ray, 2000). 
However, it is interesting to note that these sensorimotor experiences are suggested to 
entail both interpersonal and intrapersonal encounters (Heyes, 2010). That is, the stimulus-
response associations may be equally formed by responses to the observed actions of others 
or by observing our very own actions, respectively. The research thus far on sensorimotor 
experiences modulating observation-evoked response activation has focused on interpersonal 
sensorimotor experiences. However, the aforementioned efferent and reafferent processes 
associated with self-generated action (Blakemore et al., 2000) and the potential overlap 
between self-other distinction and response modulation (Brass et al., 2009) may predict an 
alternative outcome from intrapersonal sensorimotor experience. Indeed, it could be 
predicted that the stimulus-response associations formed from self-generated actions may 
encompass a sensorimotor representation that refines one’s sense of agency, and thus works 
to isolate and inhibit primed responses during the observation of another person’s actions. 
The following study was designed and conducted to investigate the influence of 
intrapersonal sensorimotor experiences on the corticospinal activity elicited by observed 
actions. To this end, single-pulse TMS was applied to M1 to evoke MEPs from FDI and 
ADM during the observation of an index and little finger abduction movement at baseline and 
post-training test phases. Participants completed the assessment of observation-induced 
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corticospinal excitability at baseline and after gaining sensorimotor experience (training) of 
index and little finger abduction movements. Both the test phase observations and related 
sensorimotor experiences featured two separate effectors in order to fulfil our further aim of 
determining whether sensory-specific visual feedback is relevant to the influence of training 
on the modulation of corticospinal excitability. As a result, each participant completed two 
separate training phases featuring different visual feedback conditions - in one condition, the 
finger movement (e.g., index finger abduction) was trained with visual feedback of the 
moving finger, while in the other condition the alternative finger movement (e.g., little finger 
abduction) was trained without visual feedback (i.e., occlusion). 
Based on previous research (e.g., Fadiga et al., 1995), it was expected that there 
would be an increase in corticospinal activity following action-observation on congruent 
trials (e.g., MEPs from FDI while observing index finger abduction) compared to incongruent 
trials (e.g., MEPs from FDI while observing little finger abduction) during the baseline pre-
training assessment. If intrapersonal sensorimotor experiences mediating the distinction 
between self- and other-generated actions fail to modulate primed responses (as indexed by 
increased corticospinal activity during the observation of congruent compared to incongruent 
actions), then we would expect the enhanced baseline activity found in congruent compared 
to incongruent trials to persist at the post-training phase. On the other hand, if intrapersonal 
sensorimotor experiences mediating the distinction between self and other begin to modulate 
primed responses, then we would expect the enhanced baseline activity found in congruent 
compared to incongruent trials to dissipate at the post-training phase. Moreover, if these 
sensorimotor experiences are contingent upon sensory-specific visual feedback, where 
external afferent information can become integrated with the efferent and reafferent sources 
of information, then we would expect the modulation of observation-evoked excitability to 
unfold only for the vision condition. 
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Method 
Participants 
Nineteen participants took part in the study (age range between 19 and 30 years) (one 
participant was excluded due to technical error leaving eighteen participants for analysis). All 
participants were self-reported right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no 
neurological disorders. None of the participants had any contraindications to TMS. The 
experiment was approved by the University of Toronto ethics committee and conducted in 
accordance with the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
Stimuli were displayed on a LCD computer monitor that was placed 50 cm from the 
participant with a temporal resolution of 60 Hz and spatial resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels. 
The stimulus was presented via a custom-written script in MATLAB (The Mathworks Inc.), 
using Cogent 2000 toolbox. The stimulus featured an image of a hand at rest taken from the 
dorsal view in the first-person perspective. Following a variable interval (800-2400 ms), the 
stimulus hand would remain at rest or switch to a posture with the index or little finger being 
abducted. The sudden change in image from rest to abduction of the index or little finger 
gave rise to apparent motion of the finger (see Catmur & Heyes, 2011 and Press et al., 2007 
for examples). 
The experiment was completed in a single session that took approximately 1.5 hrs to 
complete. The procedure comprised a test-retest protocol featuring two types of training 
interventions (Figure 1). In the baseline and post-training tests of corticospinal excitability, 
participants were instructed to closely observe the hand stimulus presented on a screen and to 
press the X-key of the keyboard with the left hand in the event a white dot (20 mm-diameter) 
appeared on the stimulus hand. The appearance of the dot unfolded in pseudorandom fashion 
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with an equal number of occurrences for each of the different types of stimuli (static hand, 
index finger, little finger). This task was developed to ensure that participants paid close 
attention to the hand stimulus even though the finger movement was irrelevant to the task 
from the participants’ perspective (see Catmur et al., 2007). There were a total of 63 trials in 
the baseline and post-training phases which consisted of 21 trials for each stimulus condition 
(little finger abduction, index finger abduction, and rest). There were only 6 trials in which 
the white dot appeared. All participants provided 100% correct responses for the detection of 
the white dot indicating that they closely watched the hand stimuli. The type of finger 
movement was presented at random with the caveat that no one stimulus condition could be 
presented more than twice in a row.  
In between the baseline and post-training phases, participants undertook the 
sensorimotor training phase in which they completed a series of abduction movements with 
the index or the little finger. Participants only moved one of the fingers during a given set of 
training trials. Participants were instructed to repeatedly abduct the index or little finger at a 
rate of 1 Hz for up to 3 minutes (i.e., 180 movements). The rate of execution was initially 
guided by an auditory metronome (1 Hz) for the first 30 seconds of the movement (i.e., 30 
movements). The metronome was then turned off so that the participant continued the 
movement unaided. Two experimenters were present and monitored the movement training 
protocol to ensure the participant successfully upheld the movement criterion. The 
experimenters used a stopwatch to ensure the pacing and length of movement was consistent 
with the instructions. If a participant was unable to execute the movement in-time with the 
metronome during the initial 30 seconds, then they were instructed to re-start the training 
procedure. However, there were no instances in which either of the experimenters reported 
such difficulty in this relatively simple motor task. 
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For the training phase of the no vision condition protocol, participants wore a 
blindfold so they could not see the movements of their own finger. For the training phase of 
the vision condition protocol, no blindfold was worn and participants were instructed to 
closely observe their moving finger. The order of the vision conditions (i.e., vision/ no vision) 
and the assignment of the finger for each visual condition (i.e., index/little finger movements) 
were counter-balanced between participants. In other words, one half of the participants 
received visual feedback when training with the index finger, and no visual feedback when 
training with the little finger, while the other half received visual feedback when training with 
the little finger, and no visual feedback when training with the index finger.1 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
TMS and MEP recordings 
MEPs were detected by two disposable 3M red dot model 2560 Ag/AgAl surface 
electrodes that assumed the belly-to-belly montage over the first dorsal interosseous (FDI) 
and abductor digiti minimi (ADM). The two electrodes were placed over the longitudinal axis 
of the muscle between the motor point/innervation zone (i.e., distal location where the muscle 
becomes innervated at the muscle endplate) and the tendinous insertion (Stegeman & 
Hermens, 2007). The adhesive pads securing the surface electrodes were cut to size in order 
to uphold the correct positioning and obtain an inter-electrode distance of ~1 cm. The third 
(ground) electrode was placed directly over the lateral epicondyle of the elbow. EMG data 
were recorded and processed through Brainsight software (Rogue Research, Montreal, QC). 
Signals were sampled at 3000 Hz and band-pass filtered between 16 Hz and 470 Hz. The 
recording interval was time-locked to 50 ms prior to stimulation and ended 150 ms after the 
stimulation (see White, Reid, & Welsh, 2014). 
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TMS was delivered by the MagStim 200 (The MagStim Company, Carmanthenshire, 
UK) using a 70 mm figure-of-eight coil (70 mm). The coil was placed over the left primary 
motor cortex (M1) that was initially positioned at an angle subtending 45º from the 
interhemispheric fissure and perpendicular to the central sulcus. A conventional mapping and 
resting motor threshold procedure was employed. That is, the optimal scalp position was 
defined as the site that consistently produced the largest MEPs in both the FDI and ADM. To 
find this area, a location 6 cm lateral and 2 cm anterior from the vertex was first located. 
Initial TMS pulses at 30% of the stimulator output were delivered over this site. If no MEPs 
were detected from this initial stimulation, then the coil was moved in roughly 1 cm 
increments around this initial location. Each stimulus was delivered 4-8 seconds apart. If 
MEPs were still not observed after this incremental search, the coil was returned to the initial 
location and the search procedure was repeated with a 5% increase in stimulator output (i.e., 
taking the first iteration of the stimulator output to 35%). Once an MEP was observed, the 
location and orientation of the coil was adjusted around this location until the largest and 
most consistent MEPs were observed. This location and orientation was deemed the “motor 
hotspot”, and the coordinates and orientation of the coil of the hotspot were recorded in 
Brainsight to facilitate accurate re-placement of the coil. Although the MEPs elicited in FDI 
were generally of larger amplitude compared to the ADM, there were no cases in which the 
designated optimal site failed to feature both muscles being activated. Indeed, the FDI and 
ADM muscles assume satisfactorily similar areas (see Alaerts et al., 2009; Cavallo, 
Bucchioni, Casteillo, & Becchio, 2013; Sartori, Bucchioni, & Castiello, 2012). 
Once the optimal location was identified, the stimulator output was adjusted down and 
up in 1% increments until the resting motor threshold was identified. Resting motor threshold 
was determined as the stimulator output that resulted in a peak-to-peak MEP amplitude of at 
least 50µV for 5 out of 10 attempts in both the FDI and ADM, whilst the muscles were at 
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rest. Immediately prior to the testing phases, the coil was placed in the orientation and 
location recorded in Brainsight and a TMS pulse was delivered at resting motor threshold to 
ensure that an MEP could still be elicited. Providing the required peak-to-peak MEP 
amplitude was observed in both the FDI and ADM, the stimulator output was increased to the 
testing level (110% of the resting motor threshold) and the block of trials was initiated. Coil 
location and orientation (and hence the stimulated volume) were constantly monitored and 
adjusted during testing to ensure accurate and consistent location of stimulation. Test TMS 
stimuli were delivered at a variable interval (0 ms, 320 ms, 640 ms; see Catmur et al., 2007) 
following stimulus onset (the apparent abduction of the index or little finger). The desktop 
computer controlling the presentation of the stimuli also controlled the delivery of the 5V 
TTL signal (via a BNC connection) to the MagStim 200 to trigger the TMS pulse and EMG 
(Brainsight) system to commence recording of any muscle activity.  
 
Data analysis 
The EMG data from the pre-stimulation interval (-50 ms from TMS delivery) were 
analysed for any muscle pre-activation and background EMG. Specifically, trials that 
exceeded 3SDs of the within-participant root-mean-square error (RMSE) were excluded from 
the analysis.2 The mean peak-to-peak MEP amplitude from the FDI and ADM muscles were 
assigned congruent and incongruent conditions with respect to the nature of the observed 
stimulus (i.e., index or little finger abduction). Thus, the MEP data for the FDI muscle was 
identified as congruent when the participant observed the index finger abduction, and was 
identified as incongruent when observing the little finger abduction. Conversely, the MEP 
data for ADM muscle was identified as congruent when the little finger abduction was 
observed and incongruent when the index finger abduction was observed. The participant 
means for congruent and incongruent conditions were normalized by dividing by the mean 
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for the control (i.e., hand at rest or static) condition. This procedure was designed to control 
for the between-participant and between-muscle variability in absolute MEP amplitude (see 
Catmur et al., 2007). 
Trials on which the white-dot (i.e., attention check trials) did or did not appear were 
included in the analysis. Because the muscles of interest (FDI, ADM) were defined by their 
congruency with respect to the observed actions and the MEP amplitudes were normalized 
with respect to rest, the assignment of vision training protocols to particular individual 
effectors/muscles was not of theoretical relevance. Instead, the purpose of the fore mentioned 
procedure was to assess the overall impact of visual feedback in sensorimotor training on the 
corticospinal responses that are elicited during action-observation. Moreover, the 
corticospinal responses of interest are typically a function of the congruency shown between 
the effectors involved in the observed action (e.g., index finger) and area of excitation or 
measurement within the observer (e.g., FDI). Thus, the mean peak-to-peak MEP amplitudes 
were analysed using a repeated-measures ANOVA consisting of within-participant factors: 
phase (baseline, post-training), congruency (congruent, incongruent), and vision training 
(vision, no vision). Significance was declared at p < 0.05. 
 
Results 
There was no significant main effect of phase, F(1, 18) = 0.23, MSE = 0.080, p = 
0.64, partial ƞ2 = .01, which would suggest there were no overall changes in peak-to-peak 
MEP amplitudes caused by time or TMS-exposure per se (see Sartori, Bucchioni, & 
Castiello, 2012). There was a significant main effect of congruency, F(1, 18) = 17.47, MSE = 
0.010, p = 0.00, partial ƞ2 = .49, indicating a higher peak-to-peak MEP amplitude for the 
congruent (M = 1.02, SE = 0.02) compared to the incongruent (M = 0.98, SE = 0.03) stimuli. 
There was no significant main effect of vision training, F(1, 18) = 1.09, MSE = 0.054, p = 
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0.31, partial ƞ2 = .06, nor interactions between phase and congruency, F(1, 18) = 0.12, MSE 
= 0.027, p = 0.73, partial ƞ2 = .01, phase and vision training, F(1, 18) = 0.02, MSE = 0.036, p 
= 0.89, partial ƞ2 = .00, and congruency and vision training, F(1, 18) = 0.67, MSE = 0.045, p 
= 0.43, partial ƞ2 = .04. 
There was, however, a significant three-way interaction between phase, congruency 
and vision training, F(1, 18) = 7.34, MSE = 0.045, p = 0.01, partial ƞ2 = .29 (Figure 2). To 
understand the source of this interaction, two separate simple interaction effects (i.e., separate 
congruency by vision ANOVAs) for each level of phase (baseline, post-training) were 
conducted (Howell, 2013). For the analysis of the baseline data, there was no significant main 
effect of congruency, F(1, 18) = 3.97, MSE = 0.027, p > 0.05, partial ƞ2 = .18, nor vision 
training, F(1, 18) = 0.65, MSE = 0.036, p > 0.05, partial ƞ2 = .03. In addition, there was no 
significant interaction between congruency and vision training, F(1, 18) = 2.05, MSE = 
0.045, p > 0.05, partial ƞ2 = .10. The analysis of the post-training data revealed no significant 
main effect of congruency, F(1, 18) = 2.25, MSE = 0.027, p > 0.05, partial ƞ2 = .11, nor 
vision training, F(1, 18) = 1.00, MSE = 0.036, p > 0.05, partial ƞ2 = .05. However, there was 
a significant interaction between congruency and vision training, F(1, 18) = 5.76, MSE = 
0.045, p < 0.05, partial ƞ2 = .24. Simple main effect analysis on post-training data at each 
level of vision training (vision, no vision) revealed a significant congruency effect for no 
vision training, F(1, 18) = 6.37, MSE = 0.045, p < 0.05, partial ƞ2 = .26, but there was no 
significant effect of congruency for vision training, F(1, 18) = 0.76, MSE = 0.045, p > 0.05, 
partial ƞ2 = .04. These findings indicate that the increased corticospinal activity found for the 
observation of congruent compared to incongruent movements continued to emerge after 
training without visual feedback, but became attenuated following training with visual 
feedback. 
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[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
Discussion 
Observing another person’s actions can involuntarily prime responses within the 
action-observation or mirror-matching system of the observer. This influence of action-
observation is thought to occur because the observed action can map onto and activate the 
corresponding motor representation within the observer. The modulation of primed responses 
during action-observation may be mediated by a distinction between self- and other-
generated actions with a limited primed response effect following an increased distinction. 
This distinction may result from the generation of a forward model of action and the related 
predicted sensory consequences of the person’s own movement. These forward models can 
be refined and updated by sensorimotor experiences or stimulus-response associative 
learning. Thus, intrapersonal sensorimotor experience may decrease the priming of response 
codes following the observation of another person’s movement because it accommodates a 
greater self-other distinction. 
The current study tested this prediction by examining the influence of sensorimotor 
experiences pertaining to self-generated action on the corticospinal activity during action-
observation. It was predicted that if intrapersonal sensorimotor experience enhances the 
distinction between self and other, then the increase in corticospinal activity that emerges 
during action-observation should be decreased following a period of intrapersonal 
sensorimotor training. Moreover, because the refinement and updating of internal models of 
action are contingent upon the integration of external sensory afference, it was predicted that 
this effect would unfold only for individuals that received visual feedback during training. On 
the other hand, training without visual feedback of the moving limb would not affect 
observation-induced corticospinal activity because the internal models would no longer be 
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refined and updated in the same way. The results confirmed that the increase in corticospinal 
activity following the observation of congruent compared to incongruent actions detected at 
baseline was no longer present after individuals were trained with visual feedback of their 
own movements. However, the increase in corticospinal excitability following action-
observation continued to manifest following training without visual feedback. 
To date, much of the research has adopted sensorimotor training in the context of 
enhancing perception-action coupling to indicate an increase in imitation (Heyes et al., 2005; 
Press et al., 2007), and corticospinal activity (Catmur et al., 2007). Indeed, the activation of 
the mirror-matching system (IPL, IFG, vPM) within the human brain appears to be larger 
following the observation of more familiar actions than less familiar actions (e.g., Calvo-
Merino, Glaser, Grezes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2005; Cross, Hamilton, & Grafton, 2006). 
These works have been leveraged to formalise a theory of response-priming effects referred 
to as Associative Sequence Learning (ASL) theory, which states that sensorimotor 
experiences, including the observation and response to other-generated actions (interpersonal) 
and the observation of our own executed actions (intrapersonal), form an excitatory stimulus-
response association that accommodates the imitation or mimicry of observed actions (Heyes, 
2001; 2010). At first glance, the present findings may seem to conflict with the fore 
mentioned account because one might predict larger differences in congruent and incongruent 
action-observation following sensorimotor experience. However, the present data do in fact 
support the idea that the observation of actions forms a stimulus-response association. 
Nevertheless, in this instance, we suggest that intrapersonal sensorimotor experience results 
in changes to the forward model of self-generated action, which can then accommodate a 
distinction between self and other. This distinction can then contribute to the inhibition of 
observation-evoked primed responses (see later for further discussion). Notably, the 
difference between the present work and from the previous accounts comes from the nature 
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or source of sensory information because the sensorimotor experiences in our study pertain to 
an intrapersonal encounter (i.e., self-execution + self-observation) as opposed to training in 
an interpersonal setting (i.e., other-observation + self-execution,) (e.g., Catmur et al., 2007). 
That is, the development of a stronger intrapersonal stimulus-response association, which was 
formed from visual feedback of the observers’ own movement, coincides with the updating of 
an internal model of the person’s own action and the predicted sensory consequences. To this 
end, the passive observation of other-generated action elicits a smaller primed response effect 
following intrapersonal training because there is now an absence of the physical execution 
and associated ‘efference copy’, which was once a feature of the observed movement. 
Indeed, the current instance of sensorimotor training that resulted in decreased 
corticospinal excitability during action-observation was likely related to the updating of the 
internal models of action. That is, the generation of one’s own movement is coincident with 
the generation of an ‘efference copy’, which in turn, accommodates a forward model of the 
predicted sensory consequences. When these predicted sensory consequences are matched to 
the actual sensory consequences, then the observer will judge the action to be a result of their 
own motor commands (Blakemore et al., 2000). Following this model of motor control, 
researchers have striven to understand how the internal models of action can be updated by 
sensorimotor training (e.g., Hayes et al., 2012a, b; Ong & Hodges, 2010). In addition, 
evidence from intentional binding, which is suggested to reflect the sense of agency, shows 
an increased tendency to bind the perceived occurrence of self-generated action (reafference) 
and its subsequent stimulus event (external afference) following a period of stimulus-
response training (Moore, Dickinson et al., 2011; Moore, Wegner et al., 2009). Therefore, in 
the context of the current study, it is possible the sensorimotor experiences and the associated 
updating of the internal model may enrich the observers’ awareness of self-generated action, 
and with it, the distinction from ‘other’ observed actions. Interestingly, this effect was found 
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only in the condition in which the participants had received visual feedback of their own 
movement. 
Consistent with the ideas discussed previously, and the fact that the modulation of 
corticospinal excitability was specific to the presence of visual feedback, we have recently 
found that interpersonal motor interference found during a behavioural task is contingent 
upon intrapersonal experiences consisting of visual feedback. Specifically, it is shown that 
the movement execution errors arising from the observation of incongruent compared to 
congruent movements begins to decrease following a period of training with visual feedback 
of the observer’s own limb movements (Roberts et al., 2016). Meanwhile, training without 
visual feedback failed to decrease the motor interference effect. In the context of these 
findings, it appears that the external visual afference was required to couple with the efferent 
and reafferent sources of information during sensorimotor training. Presumably, the increased 
exposure to visual feedback refined an internal model of action that became more dependent 
upon the presence of vision (see also, Khan et al., 1998; Proteau et al., 1987). 
Of note, the present findings lend strong support to the notion of modulating prime 
response effects following potential changes to the awareness of self- and other-generated 
actions. Indeed, previous evidence indicates that the tendency to execute faster motor 
responses (e.g., index finger lifting) when observing congruent (e.g., index finger lifted) 
compared to incongruent (e.g., middle finger lifted) action stimuli may be attenuated by an 
increased self-related focus (manipulated by the presence of a mirror that reflected an image 
of the observers’ own hand) (Spengler, Brass, Kuhn, & Schutz-Bosbach, 2010; see also, 
Wang & Hamilton, 2013). These modulation effects have been attributed to neural regions 
associated with social cognition including the rTPJ and mPFC. Indeed, a decrease in 
automatic imitation has also been indicated following anodal (excitatory) direct current 
stimulation of the rTPJ (Santiesteban, Banissy et al., 2012), while inversely increasing 
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following a virtual lesion of the rTPJ (using repetitive TMS (rTMS)) (Sowden & Catmur, 
2015). Moreover, these same regions have been attributed to the distinction between self and 
other-generated actions (Brass et al., 2009; Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 2009). 
Therefore, in the context of the present study, it may be the modulation of corticospinal 
responses following sensorimotor training resulted from the mediation of neural regions 
associated with social cognition (rTPJ, mPFC) as the observer became more aware of their 
own and other-generated actions. 
To summarise, the present study found that the increase in corticospinal activity 
during action-observation can be attenuated by intrapersonal sensorimotor training with 
visual feedback of the observers’ own movement. We suggest that this decrease may have 
been a consequence of the observer accruing an internal model of self-generated action, 
which accommodated the distinction between self-generated actions and ‘other’ observed 
actions. To our knowledge, this is one of the first studies to indicate that intrapersonal 
sensory-specific (i.e., visual) associative learning may be used to inversely inhibit a primed 
response following action-observation. The present findings differ from previous evidence of 
associative learning causing an enhanced primed response effect. This difference may be 
because of the nature of the stimulus-response training adopted within the present study, 
where the observers received feedback of their own movements. Such modulation would 
make intuitive sense for self-generated action as the training of one’s own movements can 
help foster independent and accurate execution within social contexts by attenuating the 
potentially deleterious effects that may emerge from other people’s actions (i.e., motor 
interference). Future research may wish to elaborate on these suggestions by examining the 
influence of stimulus-response training from both self- and other-generated actions on primed 
response effects including, but not limited to, automatic imitation.
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Illustration of the visual stimuli and experimental procedure. Participants were 
assessed for their corticospinal excitability following the observation of action postures 
(baseline, post-training). The stimulus initially featured an image of a static hand followed by 
the presentation of an index and little finger abduction posture, which evokes the impression 
of apparent human movement. Participants would then train by continually abducting their 
index and little finger with (as indicated by the colour image) or without (as indicated by the 
greyscale image) visual feedback (training). The assignment of visual feedback conditions to 
each finger was counter-balanced across the participant pool. 
 
Figure 2. Mean MEP ratio for the observation of congruent and incongruent action stimuli as 
a function of phase (baseline, post-training) and vision training (vision, no vision). Error bars 
represent the positive and negative standard errors for the congruent and incongruent 
conditions respectively. 
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Footnotes 
1. Since the participants completed the two training protocols within the same session 
(i.e., vision and no vision training), there is the possibility that overall resting 
corticospinal excitability may have changed as result of the order in which the 
training conditions were received. Thus, we conducted a further analysis that 
incorporated a between-measures factor of order into the main omnibus ANOVA: 
order (vision first, no vision first), phase (baseline, post-training), congruency 
(congruent, incongruent), vision training (vision, no vision). There was no significant 
main, F(1, 17) = 0.56, MSE = 0.069, p = 0.47, partial ƞ2 = .03, or interaction effects 
(order x congruency: F(1, 17) = 3.72, MSE = 0.01, p = 0.07, partial ƞ2 = .18, order x 
phase x vision training: F(1, 17) = 1.85, MSE = 0.034, p = 0.19, partial ƞ2 = .10, 
remaining order effects: Fs < 1) that featured the factor of order. As a result, we 
presume there to be little or no influence of the time of delivering the two forms of 
training protocols on resting corticospinal excitability. 
2. To ensure the background EMG (i.e., corticospinal activity) did not confound the 
main MEP results, we analysed the mean pre-activation (-50 ms) RMSE scores in a 
similar manner to our main analysis. That is, RMSE scores during the pre-stimulation 
period were submitted to a repeated-measures ANOVA featuring factors of phase 
(baseline, post-training), congruency (congruent, incongruent) and vision training 
(vision, no vision). The results of this analysis did not reveal any significant main, or 
interaction effects (congruency x vision: F(1, 18) = 2.42, MSE = 0.010, p = 0.14, 
partial ƞ2 = .12, phase x congruency x vision: F(1, 18) = 2.11, MSE = 0.011, p = 0.16, 
partial ƞ2 = .11, remaining statistical effects: Fs < 1). As a result, there was no 
indication of a confounding influence of background EMG and increased 
corticospinal activity when the participant was supposed to be at rest. 
